

The Quad: A perennial element in Australia's strategic outlook

Dr Anna Hayes

James Cook University & East Asia Security Centre (Honorary Research Fellow)

[East Asia Security Centre](#)

[东亚安全中心](#)

Peer-reviewed Conference Paper

2019 East Asia Security Symposium and Conference

同行互评会议论文

2019 东亚安全座谈讨论会

<https://easc.scholasticahq.com/>

Published Version July 2020

For information about this paper or the East Asia Security Centre's Peer-reviewed publishing site please contact the Editor-in-Chief [Jonathan H. Ping](#) 想要了解关于论文、或东亚安全座谈讨论会同行互评出版地址的信息，平易

The Quad: A perennial element in Australia's strategic outlook

Abstract: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), has drawn considerable attention in Australia, and beyond, since its establishment in 2007 and re-emergence in 2017.

However, Australia has had a recurrent desire for a quadripartite grouping of states within the region. This paper examines early post-war debates on the need for a quadripartite grouping in the Indo-Pacific region. In doing so, this paper argues that Australia has long viewed regional strategy through the lens of a quadripartite grouping of like-minded states within the Indo-Pacific region, making the Quad more a perennial element in Australia's strategic outlook than a recent development.

KEYWORDS: The Quad, Indo-Pacific, Commonwealth, ANZUS, Australia

THE QUAD: A PERENNIAL ELEMENT IN AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), has drawn considerable attention since its claimed establishment in 2007 and re-emergence in 2017. Coinciding with a change in terminology for the region from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, there has been much debate inside of Australia over what the significance of both the Indo-Pacific and the Quad hold in terms of Australia's strategic outlook.¹ This paper argues Australia has long desired a quadripartite grouping of states within the region (a Quad). It focuses its analysis on the Pacific Pact-ANZUS Treaty negotiations and two symposia held in the mid-1960s. Both symposia involved discussions over the role and composition of a quadripartite group of states in the Indo-Pacific. By adopting a historical lens, this paper argues that contemporary desires for a Quad are not a new development in Australian strategic thinking. Rather, Australia's continual revisiting of the need for an Indo-Pacific Quad reflects Australian unease over its geographic reality as an "island off the coast of Asia", its historical evolution, but also its belief that regional stability and security could be maintained by such a grouping of like-minded states.² Therefore, in order to avoid ahistorical analysis, the perennial nature of the Quad within Australia's strategic outlook must be taken into account in contemporary assessments of the re-emergence of the Quad concept in 2007 and again in 2017.³

Australia's Close Call

In the immediate aftermath of World War Two, Australia was deeply concerned about a resurgent imperial Japan and any other threats that might arise within the region. There was growing focus on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) and their close

¹ The change in terminology is also not a new development, instead it is a return to previous terminology for the region. See Hayes, Anna, "From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific? Evaluating Australia's changing terminology," *East Asia Security Symposium and Conference: Great Power Competition or Collaboration in the Indo-Pacific?* Peer Reviewed Conference Papers, vol. 1, no. 1, (2018): accessed 19 August 2019, <https://easc.scholasticahq.com/article/5765-from-asia-pacific-to-indo-pacific-evaluating-australia-s-changing-terminology>. For an example of contemporary debates over the Quad, see Graham, Euan, Pan, Chengxin Pan, Hall, Ian, Kersten, Rikki, Zala, Benjamin & Percy, Sarah, "Debating the Quad," *The Centre of Gravity Series*, no. 39 (March 2018): accessed 19 August 2019, http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/uploads/2018-03/cog_39_web_-_debating_the_quad.pdf.

² Fernandes argues that Australia's position as "an island off the coast of Asia" is deeply ingrained within Australia's geopolitical understanding of itself and how it sees the region. He draws comparisons between Britain being "an island off the coast of Europe" and the United States being "an island off the coast of the Eurasian landmass". In all three instances, none of these powers want to see a single power dominant the landmass they are an island off the coast of, so for Australia, the rise of China is a deeply unnerving new geopolitical reality. See Fernandes, Clinton, *Island off the Coast of Asia* (Clayton: Monash University Publishing, 2018), 1.

³ It is important not to overstate what the Quad 2.0 constitutes. Malcolm Cook cautions there has been a "widespread misread" and "overanalysis" of the Quad. Cook and Dhruva Jaishankar identify that the Quad is, at best, an informal name for a grouping of states that according to Jaishankar is currently no more than a "bureaucratic-level foreign-ministry-led dialogue that meets occasionally after a 10-year hiatus". See: Jaishankar, Dhruva, "The real significance of the Quad," *The Strategist* (24 October 2018): accessed 26 August 2019, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-real-significance-of-the-quad/>; and Cook, Malcolm, "The great Indo-Pacific misread," *The Strategist* (1 November 2018): accessed 26 August 2019, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-great-indo-pacific-misread/>.

connections to the Chinese Communist Party following their victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949. However, what transpired during World War Two is important in understanding Australia's post-war strategic outlook.

The extent of Japanese imperialism across the Indo-Pacific during World War Two, and Australia's close call in that war, deeply influenced Australia's post-war foreign policy. During the war, a number of sites across northern Australia experienced Japanese bombing raids, the most notable of which was the bombing of Darwin on 19 February 1942.⁴ Japanese submarines attacked Sydney Harbour during late May and early June 1942, resulting in maritime power constituting an important part of Australia's future threat calculations. The failure of the British to repel the Japanese and the fall of the British naval base at Singapore were also deeply significant. The Japanese victory at Singapore resulted in the capture of 15,000 Australian servicemen (plus many civilians) and was a deeply scarring experience for the Australian nation.⁵

Before it fell, British naval defence via Singapore was the backbone of Australia's defence and security. Once Singapore fell, the British retreat from Southeast Asia, combined with the sheer number of Australian servicemen interned in Changi Prison and on the Burma Railway, left Australians feeling abandoned by the British. Morale collapsed and there was a growing fear of imminent Japanese invasion.⁶ One week after the fall of Singapore, Australian defence was handed over to the United States General Douglas MacArthur. This represented a monumental shift in Australian statehood and morale, and it would affect Australia's post-war strategic thinking. Australia now had two "great and powerful friends", the United Kingdom and the United States.⁷

The fear of Japanese invasion tapped into the existing fear of invasion within the Australian psyche.⁸ Contingency plans should the invasion occur reflect the depth of Australian desperation. Australian army chiefs of staff proposed a secret plan to the Curtin government: the infamous "Brisbane Line", which comprised an arc extending from Brisbane to Adelaide. If the Japanese invaded, Australia would seek to maintain its sovereign territory by

⁴ The Battle of Darwin as it is known was an extensive bombing raid by the Japanese. Darwin experienced two waves of bombardment from over 240 Japanese aircraft in total, the same squadron involved in the earlier bombing of Pearl Harbour. The raids resulted in between 300 to 400 people injured and 235 dead, and extensive damage to both civilian and military facilities in Darwin. See National Archives of Australia, "The bombing of Darwin Fact Sheet – 195," (2019): accessed 19 August 2019, <http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/fact-sheets/fs195.aspx>.

⁵ Bolton, Geoffrey, *The Oxford History of Australia. Volume 5: The Middle Way 1942-1995*, 2nd edn (Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1996), 7.

⁶ One Northern Territory cattleman, Jack Kilfoyle, reported at the time that when the mass exodus of people fleeing Darwin reached the Katherine pub, "some of the men were 'nearly hysterical'". See Bolton, *The Oxford History*, 7-19.

⁷ Bolton, *The Oxford History*, 89.

⁸ The threat of Asian invasion has been a recurrent theme in Australian nationalism, frequently deployed by cartoonists and novelists. The idea of an over-populated Asia desiring the wide-open spaces of an under-populated Australia was part of the reason for the introduction of the Immigration Restriction Act (White Australia Policy) in 1901, one of the first acts passed by the newly federated state. See Markus, Andrew, *Australian Race Relations* (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1994), 112-124.

withdrawing inside of the arc and offering the territory outside of the arc (more than half of Australia's pre-war territory) to the invading Japanese.⁹ According to Nelson Johnson, the American Ambassador to Australia, morale had fallen so low that he believed Australians were "prepared to give up without a struggle; [and] that if it had been possible to leave the country, the people would have gone".¹⁰ Moreover, in May 1942 Australia's Prime Minister John Curtin ordered a "scorched earth" approach be taken by retreating armed forces to ensure nothing was left for the invading Japanese.

Across the span of the war, over 58,000 Australian servicemen fought against the Japanese in the Pacific theatre. Over 22,000 Australian servicemen were captured by the Japanese forces and 33,826 servicemen died across both the Pacific and European theatres.¹¹ Following the end of the war, Australia's Minister for External Affairs Percy Spender reignited the push for a Pacific Pact. Spender wanted to ensure that Australian security was never so vulnerable as what it had been in the immediate aftermath of Singapore's fall, and he wanted to maximise Australia's new friendship with the United States.

Negotiating the Pacific Pact

Australia's desired Pacific Pact resembled an early form of the Quad. The proposed pact was the central element of Spender's first ministerial statement made in the House of Representatives on 9 March 1950. He proposed that Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States (and possibly other Commonwealth countries such as Canada) should form a military pact of like-minded allies "to indicate their readiness to unite to defend themselves".¹² Fearing both a resurgent imperial Japan and the possibility that communist imperialism might begin to radically alter the newly de-colonised states within Asia,¹³ Spender explained the necessity and shape of the proposed pact. He stated:

What I envisage is a defensive arrangement having as its base a firm agreement between countries that have a vital interest in the stability of Asia and the Pacific, and which at the same time are capable of undertaking military commitments. I would like to think that Australia, the United Kingdom, and I fervently hope other Commonwealth countries, might form a nucleus, and that such other countries as might wish to do so should be given the opportunity of associating themselves with it ... I have in mind particularly the United States of America whose participation would give such a pact a substance it would otherwise lack. Indeed, it would be rather meaningless without the United States of America.¹⁴

⁹ Bolton, *The Oxford History*, 8.

¹⁰ Cited in Bolton, *The Oxford History*, 9.

¹¹ See Bolton, *The Oxford History*, 18-19.

¹² Dorling, Philip, *The Origins of the Anzus Treaty. A Reconsideration* (Bedford Park: Flinders Politics Monographs, Bedford Park, 1989), 11.

¹³ Gynge, Allan & Wesley, Michael, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, 2nd edn (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 240.

¹⁴ Percy Spender cited in Dorling, *The Origins*, 11-12.

Hence, Australia desired a Quad style grouping of like-minded allies to come together in the Indo-Pacific region. Together, they would ensure regional order and stability, providing a continuation of the political status quo within the region. Moreover, should war break out again, the Quad would defend Australia and New Zealand.

While Spender specifically referred to Anglo-phone countries by name, his reference to “other Commonwealth countries” is important. He believed Singapore and Malaysia could also join the Pacific Pact, thereby extending membership beyond the “Quad” grouping of Anglo-phone states.¹⁵ Also significant is that India, another Commonwealth country, was not considered. This was because India’s move towards non-alignment made Spender conclude it was not a “political possibility” for India to join.¹⁶ The United States proposed a more extensive grouping of states including island chain states’ such as Indonesia, Japan and the Philippines.¹⁷ However, the United Kingdom was opposed to the inclusion of those states.¹⁸ Despite the ongoing negotiations, the Pacific Pact did not eventuate. It was replaced by the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Treaty, which was formally signed by all parties on the 1 September 1951.

While ANZUS appears to be a tripartite agreement, four countries were involved in its negotiations making it more quadripartite than tripartite. The United Kingdom was party to the negotiations, influencing the final text of ANZUS, to ensure the impact of the treaty on its own defence requirements was minimised.¹⁹ The United Kingdom’s primary concern was that because ANZUS committed Australian troops to conflicts in the Indo-Pacific, should war break out in the Middle East, British interests may be threatened if Australian troops were unable to fight alongside the British. However, guarantees secured from the United States meant that ANZUS would actually “bolt the backdoor”, meaning Australian troops would more easily be deployed to defend British interests overseas because the United States would defend Australia should it be threatened or attacked.²⁰ Moreover, because the Preface to the Treaty identified Australia and New Zealand as members of the Commonwealth of Nations, with “military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific area”, the United Kingdom approved the redrafted treaty and ANZUS was born.

Even with ANZUS formalised, Australia continued to explore the possibility of an Indo-Pacific Quad. Two symposia hosted in the mid-1960s by the Australian Institute of International Affairs and the Australian National University provide an insight into the ongoing arguments for a quadripartite force in the region. Participants in these symposia

¹⁵ Burnett, Alan with Young, Thomas-Durell & Wilson, Christine (eds), *The ANZUS Documents* (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1991), 2.

¹⁶ Dorling, *The Origins*, 15.

¹⁷ Commonwealth of Australia, *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy. The ANZUS Treaty 1951* (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001), xxxii.

¹⁸ Commonwealth of Australia, *Documents*, 95.

¹⁹ Commonwealth of Australia, *Documents*, 95.

²⁰ Commonwealth of Australia, *Documents*, 97 and Burnett, *The ANZUS Documents*, 23. Although, it should be recognised that under Article III of the treaty, parties are only required to consult with one another after being threatened or attacked, it does not automatically require a commitment of force.

included academics, government officials, and military representatives. This paper now focuses its attention on those debates.

Nuclear Futures?

The first symposium was titled “Nuclear dispersal in Asia and the Indo-Pacific Region” and was held in September 1964, with conference proceedings published the following year.²¹ A key focus of the discussion was whether or not Australia should consider a nuclear future, and possible approaches Australia could pursue to become a nuclear state. Participants debated if Australia could develop its own nuclear strike force, identifying 1969 as the earliest date by which this could be achieved. If not a nuclear state, participants also debated whether or not Australia should invite the United States and/or the United Kingdom to position their nuclear installations on the Australian mainland. It was argued this would provide Australia a nuclear shield, even if this meant giving up some sovereign territory in the process.²²

The symposium was in response to an address by Australia’s Minister for External Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick. In 1964, Barwick challenged the academy at the ANU Political Science Summer School with the following:

Another large question that I propose to leave with you relates to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by China. It has to be accepted that China will develop not merely a nuclear explosive device but also a weapons delivery system...I should like to see our academic community paying increasing attention to...the psychological reactions within the Asian area to these developments...[and] to the possible decisions of those major Asian countries which may be looked upon as interacting powers with China...It is, in short, by no means unlikely that the kind of complex issues over nuclear weapons that have arisen in Europe will in due course appear in Asia with a series of repercussions that have still to be analyzed.²³

The symposium was held just one month prior to China’s first nuclear test in October 1964.²⁴ Hence, predictions that China was on the cusp of developing and exploding a nuclear device proved true. Attendees discussed possible regional reactions to such an outcome, but also how Australia could defend itself should there be an American or British withdrawal from Southeast Asia. A nuclearised Indo-Pacific and fears over Australian defence were key topics of debate. While the collected papers did not specifically use the “quadrupartite” or “quadrilateral” terminology, four powers were repeatedly identified as necessary for Indo-

²¹ See Australian Institute of International Affairs and The Australian National University (AIIA & ANU) (ed), *Proceedings of the seminar on nuclear dispersal in Asia and the Indo-Pacific region*, 5-6 September 1964, Defence Studies Project (Canberra: Australian Institute of International Affairs and The Australian National University, 1965).

²² AIIA & ANU, *Nuclear dispersal*, 20, 38.

²³ AIIA & ANU, *Nuclear dispersal*, i.

²⁴ Robert, J A G, *A History of China*, 3rd edn (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 274.

Pacific stability: the United States; the United Kingdom; Australia; and New Zealand. Participants desired a continuation of the strong bonds between these states and the above grouping of states reflected Australia's Commonwealth-American interdependence post-World War Two.

The Commonwealth dynamic was important as some participants expanded the quadripartite grouping to include a fifth member, Canada.²⁵ Canada was suitable as a member of the British Commonwealth, and because it constituted a Pacific power. While some participants hoped to expand the group further to include other regional states, the comfort of those Commonwealth-American bonds saw the discussion frequently return to just the four Anglo-phone states. It was frequently asserted Australia shared a "powerful loyalty" with these states, having fought alongside them in both the First and Second World Wars.²⁶

While it was suggested that India might acquire nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear China, participants were confident that the "Indian bomb...would be no threat to Australia".²⁷ This was due to India's Commonwealth membership and its status as a democracy governed by the rule of law. Finally, while Indonesia, China and the Soviet Union were identified as key threats to regional security and to Australia, the naval weakness of both China and Indonesia reduced their perceived threat to Australia.²⁸ This is a particularly salient point in relation to the re-emergence of the Quad as since the fall of Singapore, naval capabilities have been integral to Australian threat assessments. As a result, many scholars link the re-emergence of the Quad in 2017 as primarily motivated by concerns over China's expanding maritime power, its creeping annexation in the South China Sea, and the militarisation of its artificial islands located there.²⁹

The Commonwealth Family and Regional Friends

The 1965 symposium furthered these earlier discussions and again reinforced the perceived bonds of Commonwealth membership. It was titled "Commonwealth responsibilities for security in the Indo-Pacific region" and it brought together representatives from the British and New Zealand High Commissions, the Australian government, the Australian Defence forces, as well as academics.³⁰ The idea of a Quad was now a firm proposition, rather than being inferred, again comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Concerned over its Anglo-dominated membership, some participants proposed

²⁵ AIIA & ANU, *Nuclear dispersal*, 100.

²⁶ AIIA & ANU, *Nuclear dispersal*, 100.

²⁷ AIIA & ANU, *Nuclear dispersal*, 13.

²⁸ AIIA & ANU, *Nuclear dispersal*, 15.

²⁹ See: Thakur, Ramesh, "Australia and the Quad," *The Strategist* (5 July 2018): accessed 21 March 2019, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-and-the-quad>; Thu, Huang Le 2018, "'Indo-Pacific': (re-)revise and resubmit," *The Strategist* (8 June 2018): accessed 21 March 2019, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/indo-pacific-re-revise-and-resubmit>; and Brewster, David (ed), *Indo-Pacific Maritime Security: Challenges and Cooperation*, March 2016, (National Security College: Acton, 2016).

³⁰ See AIIA & ANU (ed), *Proceedings of the seminar on Commonwealth responsibilities for security in the Indo-Pacific region*, 11 September 1965, Defence Studies Project (Canberra: Australian Institute of International Affairs and The Australian National University, 1966).

extending membership to include regional Commonwealth states such as Malaysia and Singapore. In doing so they hoped to avoid being cast as an “Anglo-Saxon Club”.³¹ It was also argued that India and Japan “must be engaged sooner or later”.³² Hence, the Quad was something that would start small and then expand, mirroring the earlier desired parameters for a Pacific Pact.

The proposed inclusion of Malaysia, Singapore, India and Japan (and other unnamed Asian allies of the United States) also highlighted it was these states with whom Australia felt most comfortable. Australia regarded them a natural fit, with Malaysia, Singapore and India being members of the Commonwealth and Japan being an ally of the United States under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.³³ The central premise of the 1965 Quad was that an “integration of forces” from the major Quad powers was needed in order to maintain stability and security across the Indo-Pacific.³⁴ Moreover, the eventual composition of the expanded Quad would ensure a “multi-nationalization of the peace-keeping or policing role[s]” in the Indo-Pacific should they be required.³⁵ In particular, discussions identified the Quad would be advantageous to Australia and New Zealand because the stability and growth of both states necessitated a stable regional environment. Participants also believed significantly more engagement with regional neighbours should be undertaken, and that both Australia and New Zealand needed to extend their thinking beyond the narrow lens of ANZUS and the Commonwealth umbrella.³⁶

Undergirding the 1965 Quad was stability maintenance in the 9,000 mile arc of the Indo-Pacific, with both Singapore and Sydney identified as pivot points.³⁷ The belief that periodic regional instability and the threat of communist imperialism throughout Southeast Asia might require a multinational force that “could employ joint and more or less permanent facilities in dealing with emergencies that arose from time to time” also underpinned the Quad, with possible bases proposed for Singapore, Malaysia and Australia.³⁸ To avoid misperceptions of the Quad being a covert attempt at renewed British imperialism, participants stressed that such forces should only intervene in peacekeeping military activities when invited, and they had no intention of “trying to revive the Pax Britannica”.³⁹ Like the Pacific Pact before it, the 1965 Quad never materialised into a formal treaty or security organisation. Rather, the discussions in 1964 and 1965 demonstrate the longevity of an Indo-Pacific Quad in Australian strategic thinking.

³¹ AIIA & ANU, *Commonwealth responsibilities*, 38-39.

³² AIIA & ANU, *Commonwealth responsibilities*, 47.

³³ See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America,” 19 January 1960, (2014): accessed 26 August 2019, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html>.

³⁴ AIIA & ANU, *Commonwealth responsibilities*, 29.

³⁵ AIIA & ANU, *Commonwealth responsibilities*, 39.

³⁶ By the Commonwealth umbrella, the author refers to the significant links provided to member states as part of the Commonwealth family. This includes that Commonwealth member states regularly engage with each other via institutions such as the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings and the Commonwealth Secretariat.

³⁷ AIIA & ANU, *Commonwealth responsibilities*, 13.

³⁸ AIIA & ANU, *Commonwealth responsibilities*, 39.

³⁹ AIIA & ANU, *Commonwealth responsibilities*, 40.

Commonwealth-American Interdependence

The bonds of Commonwealth-American interdependence were championed by symposia participants. They reported relations between Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States were grounded in them “sharing a parliamentary polity, a family relationship continuously renewed by inter-migration, a common Crown and more or less the same approach to foreign relations and to the employment of armed force”.⁴⁰ Extending this further, participants noted that “after fifteen years of ANZUS and of domination by the somewhat specious idea of geographic regionalism, circumstances now induce us again to capitalise on those facts of British community in the southern oceans”.⁴¹ For Australia, the Quad already existed via Commonwealth-American interdependence. Moreover, in 1965, Australia did not face a regional state that had the naval capacity to invade its shores. Hence, it lacked any significant motivation to look beyond its existing security arrangements.

However, strategy was also involved. Some participants were concerned that if a quadripartite force was established, rather than igniting the United Kingdom and the United States regionally, it could actually result in them withdrawing from the region. This would leave primary responsibility for regional stability and security to Australia and New Zealand.⁴² Determined to remain significant to the United States and to ensure its continued presence in the region, by 1967 Australia had become “the largest single centre for American missile and space operations outside of the United States”, providing multiple joint bases, including Pine Gap.⁴³ These developments helped Australia to play a contributing role throughout the Cold War. According to Fernandes, the Australian geopolitical tradition has been a deliberate strategy to deploy all of its foreign policy tools to “stay on the winning side of the geopolitical contest”.⁴⁴ Hence for Australia, staying on the winning side meant keeping the United Kingdom and the United States engaged within the Indo-Pacific region, supporting efforts to contain communist imperialism, and adequately responding to “Communist China’s aggressive policies”.⁴⁵

The 1965 symposium postscript, written in 1966, acknowledged another two factors identifying Australia’s strong desires for continued regional presence by the United States and the United Kingdom. Firstly, Australia’s ignorance “of the constraints upon peace-keeping operations in Asia and the Indo-Pacific by advanced Western Powers”, particularly in relation to the military technological developments and rapidly changing circumstances in both newly independent Asian states but also in Western societies. Secondly, the reality that Australia and New Zealand would be unable to raise the forces necessary for prolonged military engagements in the region, due to their small populations.⁴⁶ Hence, it was simply not

⁴⁰ AIIA & ANU, *Commonwealth responsibilities*, 65.

⁴¹ AIIA & ANU, *Commonwealth responsibilities*, 39.

⁴² AIIA & ANU, *Commonwealth responsibilities*, 71.

⁴³ Bolton, *The Oxford History*, 169.

⁴⁴ Fernandes, *Island off the Coast*, 217.

⁴⁵ AIIA & ANU, *Commonwealth responsibilities*, 44.

⁴⁶ AIIA & ANU, *Commonwealth responsibilities*, 45.

the time for Australia and New Zealand to take the leading role in regional affairs so discussions of the need for a quadripartite force in the region were discontinued.

Conclusion

Since World War Two, Australian foreign policy has been reliably bipartisan, with incremental rather than radical change.⁴⁷ One foreign policy constant has been that Commonwealth membership has provided Australia links to diverse states across the Indo-Pacific. ANZUS has also connected Australia to regional friends of the United States, most notably Japan and the Philippines. While a quadripartite grouping of states within the region has been a perennial element in Australia's foreign policy possibilities, by examining the desired but unattainable Pacific Pact, the ANZUS negotiations, and the discussions during both symposia, this paper has identified a number of reasons why the perennial Indo-Pacific Quad has thus far not eventuated. Firstly, Commonwealth-American interdependence meant Australia already had a comfortable security arrangement in the Indo-Pacific region. Secondly, Australia wanted to ensure continued presence of the United Kingdom and the United States in the region. Finally, Australia did not face a maritime threat from within the region hence an Indo-Pacific Quad has historically not been a high priority. These factors warrant careful consideration when assessing the current discussions of the Quad 2.0.

Rather than adopting an ahistorical approach to the Quad, contemporary discussions must recognise the perennial nature of an Indo-Pacific Quad in Australia's strategic thinking. One conclusion frequently made in relation to the Quad 2.0 is that the rise of China is driving this "new" development of a Quad. This paper disagrees with such an approach because it overlooks the longevity of Australian desires for an Indo-Pacific Quad. This more nuanced approach reflects the Quad re-emerged in 2007 and then again in 2017. Hence, rather than viewing the Quad 2.0 as an attempt at Chinese containment, which Cook has already identified as one of the "current misreads" of the Quad, this paper argues more scholarly engagement with the 1940s to 1960s discussions of an Indo-Pacific Quad are necessary. Moreover, historical analysis forces examination of Australian motivations to establish an Indo-Pacific Quad. Motivations included Australian desires to facilitate dialogue and cooperation with other like-minded regional states, and to ensure peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, which would benefit the growth of regional states, including Australia and New Zealand. As a result, rather than being a reactionary new development to an increasingly assertive China, instead, the Quad 2.0 represents continuity in Australian strategic thinking.

⁴⁷ Fernandes, *Island off the Coast*, 217.